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[Crim. No. 11026. In Bank. Dec.U,1961.] 
In re FREDERICK A. HOFFA1AN et al. on Habeas Corpus. 
[1] Constitutional Law-Fundamental Right&-Regulation-First 
Amendment Activities.-Activitics that have the specific con-
stitutional protection of U. S. Const., 1st Amend., cannot be 
abridged or regulated unless the regulation is necessary, 
considering available alternatives, to protect other interests, 
and under this test overly broad regulations must fall. 
[2] Id. - Fundamental Rights - Regulation - First Amendment 
Activities.-If the state curtails freedoms protected by U. S. 
Const., 1st .Amend., to protect an interest that is nonexistent, 
whether claimed on behalf of the government or on behalf of 
a private individual, it violates U. S. Const., 1st and 14th 
Amends. 
[3] Municipal Corporations-Ordinance-Validity-Impairment of 
Freedom of Speech.-Although the primary uses of municipal 
and railroad property can be protected by ordinances prohibit-
ing activities that interfere with such uses, in neither case can 
activities protected by U. S. Const., 1st Amend., be prohibited 
solely because the property involved is not maintained pri-
marily as a forum for such activities. 
[4a,4b] Constitutional Law-Fundamental Right&-Freedom of 
Expression-Scope of Protection.-The activities of about 15 
persons in entering a railroad station and distributing le~flets 
protesting certain foreign policy action of the U. S. and the 
impending court-martial of soldiers for disobedience of orders 
[4] See Cal.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, § 207; Am.Jur.2d, Con-
stitutional Law, § 341 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1,2] Constitutional Law, §1l3; [3] 
. Municipal Corporations, § 236.6; Carriers, § 75; [4] Constitutional 
Law, § 116(2); Carriers, § 15; Commerce, § 5; [5] Constitutional 
Law, § 116(3); Municipal Corporations, § 236.6; [6] Municipal 
Corporations, § 137; Disorderly Conduct. 
I 
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relating thereto, and acco~ting military men and others to 
make their views known, were protected by U. S. Const., 1st 
Amend., and coulrl not constitutionally be prohibited by the 
city in the exercise of its police power nor by the railroad 
under the law of trespass, where such activities were carried 
on without disturbance and without interfering with the run-
ning of the railroad, and it was immaterial that another 
forum, equally effective, may have been available. 
[6a, 5b] Id. - Fundamental Rights - Freedom of Expression -
Limitation on Right: Municipal Corporations-Ordinances-
Validity.-Although at railroad stations and similar terminals 
activities protected by U. S. Const., 1st Amend., may be 
controlled as to such factors as total numbers taking part and 
the avoidance of peak hours, congested areas, dangerous zones 
and littering, that part of Los Angeles Municipal Code, 
§ 421.11.1, making it unlawful "to remain ... longer than 
reasonB;bly necessary to transact ... business ... with any 
common carrier using such . . . depot," must be stricken as 
unconstitutionally placing a total prohibition on such activi-
ties. 
[6] Municipal Corporations-Police Power-Loitering: Disorderly 
Conduct.-To "loaf or loiter," as forbidden in Los Angeles 
Municipal Code, § 421.11.1, regUlating passenger terminals, 
bears a "sinister or wrongful" implication, and as 80 inter-
preted· is a justified police measure that protects the citY'f!. 
interest in assuring public safety without interfering with the 
legitimate exercise of any constitutionally protected activity. 
PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from cus-
tody. Writ granted. 
A. L. Wirin, Fred Okrand, Laurence R. Sperber and Mi-
chael Hannon for Petitioners. 
Roger Arnebergh, City Attorney, Philip E. Grey, .Assistant 
City Attorney, and Michael T. Sauer, Deputy City Attorney, 
for Respondent. 
TRA YNOR, C. J.-Petitioners were convicted in the Los 
Angeles Municipal Court of violating a city ordinance1 
restricting the right to be in u railroad station. The Appellate 
[6] See Cal.Jur.2d, Rev., Disorderly Conduct, § 3. 
lLos Angeles Municipal Code section 421.11.1 provides: "It shall be 
unlawful for any person to loaf or loiter in any waiting room, lobby, or 
other portion of any railway station, electric railway station, airport, 
or bus depot or upon the grounds of any common carrier adjacent thereto, 
or to remain in any such station, airport, or depot or upon any such 
Dec. 1967] IN RE HOFFMAN 847 
[67 C.2d 845; 64 Cal.Rptr. 97. 434 P.2d 353] 
Department of the Superior Court affirmed the convictions 
and refused to certify the case to the Court of Appeal. (Rule 
62 (a), Cal. Rules of Court.) Petitioners seek a writ of habeas 
corpus on the ground that the ordinance unconstitutionally 
abridges their right of free speech. 
Union Station in Los Angeles is owned by three railroad 
companies, the Southern Pacific, the Union Pacific, and the 
Santa Fe. It is a spacious area open to the community as a 
center for rail transportation. It also houses a restaurant, a 
snack bar, a cocktail lounge, and a magazine stand. Not only 
passengers but friends and relatives of passengers may freely 
enter and use the facilities of the waiting room. Entry is also 
free to those who seek food or drink or magazines and news-
papers. There are signs posted around the station stating: 
"PRIVATE PROPERTY-PERMISSION TO PASS OVER REVOCABLE AT 
ANY TIME." 
About 5 0 'clock in the afternoon of September 5, 1966, a 
group of about 15 persons, including petitioners, entered the 
station to distribute leaflets protesting United States action in 
Vietnam and the impending court martial of three soldiers at 
Fort Hood, Texas, who had refused to go to Vietnam. They 
hoped to eommunicate with soldiers who would be in the 
station on their return to Camp Pendleton after the Labor 
Day weekend. They went to the station solely to distribute 
leaflets and discuss their position with persons in the area. 
They circulated about the main entrance, the lobby, and the 
south patio of the station. The city concedes that they did not 
impede the flow of traffic to or from the station or interfere 
with the purchase or sale of tickets or the conduct of business 
by the restaurant, bar, or magazine and newspaper stand 
located on the premises. Although their leaflets littered the 
floors and seats of the lobby, the littering was by those to 
whom the leaflets were given. 
Officer Bakken, a special officer at Union Station, observed 
grounds for a period of time longer than reasonably necessary to transact 
such business as such person may have to transact with any common 
carrier nsing or occupying such station, airport, or depot, provided, how-
ever, that nothing in this section will be deemed to prohibit any person 
occupying such station, airport or depot or grounds adjacent thereto for 
the bona fide purpose of meeting relatives or acquaintances arriving upon 
any conveyance entering such place, or from accompanying or meeting 
relatives or acquaintances who are departing from such station, airport, 
or depot upon any public conveyance operating therefrom, and provided 
further that nothing in this section shall be deemed to apply to any part 
of said station, airport, depot or grounds let for use as a restaurant or 
occupied by any other business not that of a common carrier." 
) 
~: . 
, . 
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petitioners' activities and stopped them outside the station 
master's office in the south patio. After learning that they 
had no business with the railroad, he informed them that they 
were on private property engaged in activities prohibited by 
station rules. On two occasions Officer Bakken told petitioners 
that they would have to leave if they did not stop distributing 
leaflets and talking to people. He had similar conversations 
with other members of the group. All refused to leave, and 
Los Angeles police officers summoned by Officer Bakken 
arrested them. The trial court acquitted six of them,2 and 
found petitioners guilty on the ground that they were in the 
station without any business with a carrier and hence were 
loitering within the meaning of the ordinance. 
The ordinance defines the law of trespass applicable to this 
situation. Trespass laws punish presence on property 
unauthorized by the possessor thereof and conclusively pre-
sume injury from that presence. [1] [See fn. 3] The city's 
contention is essentially that thc railroads have consented to 
open their property to the general public for a limited and 
specific purpose only, namely, for the use of the transporta-
tion facilities offered, that petitioners admittedly: came onto 
the property for other purposes, and that the railroads may 
therefore demand their removal and arrest and prosecution 
for trespass. 8 
The theory advanced by the city has been unsuccessfully 
2Eight of the group were eharged in two eonsolidated actions. Four 
were acquitted on the ground that they occupied parts of the station 
excluded by the second proviso of the ordinance and two on the ground 
that there was no evidence to connect them with any violation of the 
ordinance. 
3There are two entities having an interest in this facility. The railroads 
have a proprietary interest in protecting their right to use the property 
for its primary purpose. The municipality has a governmental interest in 
preserving its right to protect public health, safety, and order. Were it 
not for the claim of specific eonstitutional proteetion for First Amend-
ment activities, either rationale would suffiee to justify excluding peti-
tioners from the station. Conduct not entitled to First Amendment pro-
teetion and therefore reeeiving only the proteetion afforded by the due 
proeess and equal protection clauses may be regulated or prohibited by 
stntutes covering more than that necessary to protect such public or 
private interests. Nor will the regulation be held invalid on the ground 
that its purpose could be as effectively acbieved by alternative means 
that do not curtail the activity in question. (~cc, e.g., United States v. 
Carole71e Products Co. (1938) 304 U.S. 144, 152-153 [82 L.Ed. 1234, 
1241-]242,58 S.Ct. 778]; compare, ibid., fn. 4, at pp. 152-153.) 
Activities that have the specific constitutional protection of tbe First 
Amendment, however, eannot be abridged or regulated unless tbe regula-
tion is necessary, considering availahle alternatives, to protect otller 
interesb~. Under tbis test, overly broad regulations must fall. (See, e.g., 
El/brandt v. Bussell (1966) 384 U.S. 11 [16 L.Ed.2d 321, 86 S.Ct. 1238].) 
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urged to justify prohibition of First Amendment activities in 
the public streets and parks. The city seeks to distinguish 
streets and parks on the ground that" From time immemorial, 
streets, sidewalks and parks have been held in trust for the 
use of the public and have been used for purposes of 
assembly, communicating thoughts and discussing public 
questions." (Paraphrasing Hague v. C.1.0. (1939) 307 U.S. 
496,515 [83 L.Ed. 1423, 1436,59 S.Ot. 954].) 
At one time it was thought that a municipality could 
prohibit First Amendment activities in streets and parks on 
the ground that they constituted an unauthorized use of such 
facilities. (Davis v. Massachusetts (1897) 167 U.S. 43 [42 
L.Ed. 71, 17 8.0t. 731].) The "time immemorial" from 
which the streets and parks have been required to be held 
open for First Amendment activities dates from 1939, when 
Hague v. C.I.O., supra, was decided.4 In a series of cases 
following Hague v. C.I.O., the Supreme Oourt determined 
that a regulation of First Amendment activities in streets and 
parks must be supported by a valid municipal interest that 
cannot be protected by different or more narrow means. Such 
activities can be regulated ~nly to the extent necessary to 
prevent interference with the municipality's interest in pro-
tecting the public health, safety, or order or in assuring the 
efficient and orderly use of streets and parks for their primary 
purposes. (See, e.g., Cox v. Louis'iana (1965) 379 U.S. 536, 
554-555 [13 L.Ed.2d 471, 483-484, 85 8.0t. 453] ; Lovell v. 
C~ty of Griffin (1938) 303 U.S. 444 [82 L.Ed. 949, 58 8.0t. 
666] ; Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310 U.8. 296 [84 L.Ed. 
1213, 60 8.0t. 900, 128 A.L.R. 1352] ; Largent v. Texas (1943) 
318 U.S. 418 [87 L.Ed. 873, 63 8.0t. 667] ; Staub v. City of 
Baxley (1958) 355 U.S. 313 [2 L.Ed.2d 302, 78 8.0t. 277] ; 
Schneider v. State (1939) 308 U.S. 147 [84 L.Ed. 155, 60 
8.0t. 146] ; Jamison v. Texas (1943) 318 U.S. 413 [87 L.Ed. 
869,63 8.0t. 669] ; Niemotko v. Ma,ryland (1950) 340 U.S. 268 
[95 L.Ed. 267, 71 8.0t. 325]; compare, e.g., Chaplinsky v. 
New Hampshire (1942) 315 U.S. 568 [86 L.Ed. 1031, 62 8.0t 
766] with OantweU v. Oonnecticut, supra, and Kllnz v. New 
York (1951) 340 U.S. 290 [95 L.Ed. 267, 280, 71 8.0t. 312, 
328] ; Feiner v. New York (1951) 340 U.S. 315 [95 L.Ed. 267, 
295, 71 8.0t. 303, 328] with Cox v. Louisiana, supra; Kovacs 
4Although the Hague ease attempted to distinguish the Davis ease 
(Hague v. C.l.O., supra, at p. 515 [83 L.Ed. at p. 1436]), it actually 
overruled it (Jamison v. Texas (1943) 318 U.S. 413, 415-416 [87 L.Ed. 
869, 872-873, 63 S.Ct. 669]). 
. ; 
I 
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v. Cooper (1949) 336 U.S. 77 [93 L.Ed. 513, 69 8.Ct. 448, 10 
A.L.R.2d 608] with Saw v. New York (1948) 334 U.S. 558 [92 
L.Ed. 1574, 68 8. Ct. 1148] and Wollam v. City of Palm 
Springs (1963) 59 Ca1.2d 276 [29 Cal.Rptr. 1, 379 P.2d 481]. 
See, generally, Niemotko v. Maryland, supra, 340 U.S. 268, 
275-283 [95 L.Ed. 267, 272-276, 71 8.Ct. 325].) This rule 
applies whether the owner of the street is a governmental 
. body or a private one. (Tucker v. Texas (1946) 326 U.S. 517, 
524 [90 L.Ed. 274, 280, 66 S.Ct. 274]; Marsh v. Alabama 
(1946) 326 U.S. 501 [90 L.Ed. 265, 66 8.Ct. 276].) [2] If 
the state curtails First Amendment freedoms to protect an 
interest that is nonexistent, whether claimed on behalf of the 
government or on behalf of a private individual, it violates 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments. (New Yark Times Co. 
v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254, 265 [11 L.Ed.2d 686, 697, 84 
8.Ct. 710, ~5 A.L.R.2d 1412]; Marsh v. Alabama, supra; 
Tucker v. Texas, supra.) 
[8] The primary uses of municipal property can be amply 
protected by ordinances that prohibit activities that interfere 
with those uses. Similarly, the primary uses of railway sta-
tions can be amply protected by ordinances prohibiting activi-
ties that interfere with those uses. In neither case can First 
Amendment activities be prohibited solely because the 
property involved is not maintained primarily as a forum for 
such activities. 
In Brown v. Louisiana (1966) 383 U.S. 131 [15 L.Ed.2d 
637, 86 8.Ct. 719] the defendants were Negroes who had 
entered the local segregated public library, asked for a book 
and were told the library did not have it. The librarian and a 
police officer then requested the defendants to leave but they 
refused to do so. No one else was in the library at the time. 
The defendants were not disorderly, but neither were they 
using the library facilities for their intended purpose. The act 
of sitting in the library was a protest against the library's 
policy of segregation. The defendants were not noisy and did 
not interfere with the functioning of the library. 
The majority of the Supreme Court reversed a conviction 
for breach of the peace on the ground that since there was no 
evidence of any disorder or disturbance that interfered with 
the use of the library for its intended purpose, the officer and 
the librarian had no right to request the defendants to leave. 
Accordingly, the defendants' refusal to leave could not 
constitutionally be punished as a breach of the peace. 
According to the dissenters, however, to constitute a breach 
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of the peace, the activity in question did not have to interfere 
with the peace, order, or safety of the public or with the 
primary use of the library facility. In their view, the state 
could treat any unauthorized use of property maintained to 
perform a specific function as a breach of the peace. The 
majority's test was whether the defendants' conduct inter-
fered with the use of the library; the minority's test was 
whether that conduct was a library use. 
[4a] Similarly in the present case, the test is not whether 
petitioners' use of the station was a railway use but whether 
it interfered with that use. No interest of the city in the 
functioning of the station as a transportation terminal was 
infringed. Petitioners' conduct was also unassailable under 
statutes aimed at protecting the city's interest in preserving 
good order, cleanliness, public health, and safety. Nor did 
their presence violate any legitimate interest of the railroads, 
their patrons, or employees. It invaded no right of privacy. 
(Of. Public Utilities Com. v. Pollak (1952) 343 U.S. 451 [96 
L.Ed. 1068, 72 S.Ct. 813].) In this respect, a railway station 
is like a public street or park. Noise and commotion are 
characteristic of the normal operation of a railway station. 
The railroads seek neither privacy within nor exclusive 
possession of their station. They therefore cannot invoke the 
law of trespass· against petitioners to protect those interests. 
Nor was there any other interest that would justify pro-
hibiting petitioners' activities. Those activities in no way 
·interfered with the use of the station. They did not impede 
the movement of passengers or trains, distract or interfere 
with the railroad employees' conduct of their business, block 
access to ticket windows, transportation facilities or other 
business legitimately on the premises. Petitioners were not 
noisy, they created no disturbance, and did not harass patrons 
who did not wish to hear what they had to say. I) 
6The only evidence in the record regarding petitioners' conduct toward 
the patrons indicated that petitioners' behavior in no way amounted to 
harassment or pestering. According to the testimony of Officer Bakken, 
one woman "stated she had been sitting on this side but One man gave 
her some literature and another started to talk to her so she moved from 
here over to this side. And as I approached-the men followed her over-
but as I approached, the two went out the south patio. Who they were 
I do not know." Officer Bakken also testified that petitioners were 
talking to two sailors and he "walked up and asked the sailors if they 
were being disturbed. And this one winked at me and shook his head." 
The fact that some people did not like petitioners' ideas does not mean 
that the way they communicated those ideas was disorderly. (See, e.g., 
Coa; v. LO'UiBiana, 81Lpra, at pp. 551-552 [13 L.Ed.2d at pp. 482-483]; 
Brown v. Louisiana, B'Upra; CantweZl v. Connecticut, B'Upra.) 
() 
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Had petitioners in any way interfered with the conduct of 
the railroad business, they could legitimately have been asked 
to leave. (Cf. Adderley v. Florida (1966) 385 U.S. 39 [17 
L.Ed.2d 149, 87 S.Ct. 242]; People v. Brown (1965) 236 
Cal.App.2d Supp. 915 [47 Cal.Rptr. 662]; People v. Poe 
(1965) 236 Cal.App.2d Supp. 928 [47 Cal.Rptr. 670] ; People 
v. Green (1965) 234 Cal.App.2d Supp. 871 [44 Cal.Rptr. 
438].6 ) Similarly, had petitioners' acitivities conflicted with 
any valid municipal interest, the municipality could have 
proceeded against them. 'l 
[00] The ordinance is composed primarily of two parts. 
The first prohibits "loafing or loitering" in a terminal; the 
second prohibits remaining in a terminal longer than neces-
sary to transact business. The obvioUs purpose of the second 
part is, as the city points out, to prevent "chaos, confusion, 
congested- waiting rooms and littered lobbies [that] would 
replace the orderly business conducted in the Union Sta-
tion." There are ways to prevent these evils and preserve the 
primary purpose of terminals, however, without forbidding 
the exercise of First Amendment freedoms within them.- (Cf. 
Wollam v. Oity of Palm Springs, supra, at pp. 285-286.) 
Litteripg. is subject to effective control by means less drastic 
(Sheltonv. Tucker (1960) 364 U.S. 479, 488 [5 L.Ed.2d 231, 
237,81 8.Ct. 247]) than forbidding the distribution of leaflets 
altogether (Schneider v. State, supra, at p. 162 [84 L.Ed. at 
p. 165]). Congestion can be avoided by controls on activities 
60f course, the degree of interference with business operations need 
not reach the level attained by the defendants in the "bank-in" eases 
(People v. Brown, su.pra; People v. Green, su.pra; People v. Poe, 8'Upra) 
before a proprietor may demand their removal. As stated above, any 
appreciable interference with the orderly carrying on of business may 
suffice. A bank may well have security problems akin to those of a jail, 
that permit it altogether to prohibit First Amendment. activities inside 
its premises. (Of. ~dderley v. Florida, 8'Upra.) Some interference, how-
ever, must be shown. (Of. Thomas v. Oollins {1944) 323 U.S. 516, 531 
[89 L.Ed. 430, 440, 65 S.Ot. 315].) 
'lIt is immaterial that another forum, equally effective, may have beeD - --
available to petitioners. As stated in Schneider v. State, npra, 308 U.S, 
147, 163 [84 L.Ed. 155, 165]: "[O]ne is not to have the exercise of his 
liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it 
may be exercised in some other place." Absent the presence of some 
conflicting interest that could be protected in no other way, petitioners 
have the right to choose their own forum. Since there is no competing 
interest present in this case, there is no need to balance, and we need 
not review those instances where the narrowness of the issue restricts the . 
appropriate audience, creating a compelling need for a particular forum 
that may be upheld against a very slight competing interest. (Cf. 
Schwartz-Torrance 111,11. Oorp. v. Bakery ct Oonfectionery Workers' Union 
(1964) 61 Oa1.2d 766 [40 Oal.Rptr. 233, 394 P.2d 921].) 
() 
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during peak hours. (See, e.g., Cottonreader v. Johnson (1966) 
252 F.Supp. 492, 500; Hurwitt v. City of Oakland (1965) 247 
F.Supp. 995; cf. Edwards v. South Oar olin a (1963) 372 U.S. 
229, 236 [9 L.Ed.2d 697, 702, 83 8.Ct. 680].) Reasonable and 
objective limitations can be placed on the number of persons 
who can be present for First Amendment activities at the 
same time, and the persons present can be required so to place 
themselves as to limit disruption. (See, e.g., Hurwitt v. City 
of Oakland, supra.) In areas normally subject to congestion, 
such as ticKet windows and turnstiles, First Amendment 
activities can be prohibited. (Cf. Adderley v. Florida, supra; 
People v. Brown, supra; People v. Poe, supra; People v. 
Green, supra.) Persons can be excluded entirely from areas 
where their presence would threaten personal danger or block 
the flow of passenger or carrier traffic, such as doorways and 
loading areas. (Cf. Adderley v. Florida, supra; People v. 
Brown, supra; People v. Green, supra.) 
In short, the second part of the ordinance completely 
prohibits protected activities although a narrower measure 
would fully achieve the intended ends and at the same time 
preserve an effective. place for the dissemination of ideas. 
Because of the overbreadth of coverage in this ordinance, the 
language prohibiting presence in a terminal longer than 
reasonably necessary to conduct business with a carrier is 
unconstitutional.8 (Cf. Elfbrandt v. Russell (1966) 384 U.S. 
11 [16 L.Ed.2d 321, 86 8.Ct. 1238].) 
[6] The first part of the ordinance forbids anyone to 
"loaf or loiter" about a terminal. For the reasons expressed 
in In re Cregler (1961) 56 Cal.2d 308, 312 [14 Cal.Rptr. 289, 
363 P .2d 305], we construe the phrase "loaf or loiter" to 
bear a "sinister or wrongful" implication. As so interpreteu 
the first part of the ordinance is a justified police measure 
that protects the city's interest in assuring public safety (cf. 
Gleason v. Municipal Court (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 584, 587 
[38 Cal.Rptr. 226]) without interfering with the legitimate 
exercise of any constitutionally protected activity. 
[5b] Striking the part of the ordinance that we have held 
to be unconstitutional does not "vitiate the whole act." (Dan-
skin v. San Diego Unified School Dist. (1946) 28 Cal.2d 536. 
8The specific language we refer to is: ". . . or to remain in any such 
station, airport, or depot or upon any such grounds for a period of time 
longer than reasonahly necessary to transact such business as such person 
may have to transact with any common carrier using or occupying such 
station, airport, or depot. . • ." 
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555 [171 P.2d 885], quoting from People v. Lewis (1939) 13 
Ca1.2d 280, 284 [89 P .2d 388].) Accordingly, all but the 
particular language we have indicated may stand. 
[4b] The trial court applied the Oregler definition of 
"loiter" and found that petitioners violated the first part of 
the ordinance. The record clearly indicates that the court 
reached this conclusion by finding that petitioners violated the 
second part of the ordinance and then reasoning that they 
were therefore present without any" lawful purpose." Since 
the second part of the ordinance is broader than constitu-
tionally permissible, petitioners' convictions cannot stand 
under any theory, for there is no other evidence that they 
were present in Union Station for an "unlawful" purpose. 
The writ is granted and the petitioners are discharged from 
custody. 
Peters, 'J., Tobriner, J., Mosk,. J., and Sullivan, J., con-
curred. 
BURKE, J., Dissenting. 
In my view the city ordinance prOVISIon in question is 
entirely reasonable and constitutes a necessary and proper 
exercise of the police power of a city.1 
It seeks to prevent occurrences in highly volatile, sensitive 
areas of public terminals by preventing unnecessary loitering 
or remaining in such terminals by persons who have no legiti-
mate business being there. 
It should not be necessary to await a disturbance, inter-
ference, riot, theft, pickpocketing, baggage snatching, block-
ing passage, soliciting for improper purposes or interference 
with the business of the common carriers involved, before a 
valid municipal interest arises to warrant the enactment or 
enforcement of the ordinance here involved.2 
Airports, railway stations, and bus depots - and their 
patrons-are faced with problems peculiar to themselves and 
not common to those of public streets, parks, playgrounds, 
libraries, museums, zoos, theaters, auditoriums, or public rest-
rooms. As one reflects upon each of the kinds of places men-
tioned one realizes that each has its sensitive areas and 
IClllifornia Constitution, article XI, Nection 11. 
2I.e., the portion of the ortlin:lIIce which makes it unlawful to remain 
in any railway station, airport, or bUB depot or the grounds for longer 
than reasonably necessary to transact business with any common carrier 
using or occupying such station, airport, or depot. 
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requires a body of law to protect the interests of all who are 
involved in utilizing such places. Such regulations evolve, as 
here, over a long period of time and not all reasons for them 
are as readily apparent as here. The determination of the need 
for such regulations has been entrusted by law to the appro-
priate governing boards, and their legislative acts are entitled 
to be upheld by the courts unless shown to be arbitrary, capri-
cious, or contrary to law. There is no semblance of such a 
showing here. 
Mass transportation terminals are designed to serve the 
convenience and interest of the traveling public and require 
the handling of large numbers of persons and baggage. 
Crowds of friends or relatives meeting passengers or seeing 
them off add to the mass of people frequenting terminals. 
Problems of lost luggage and lost persons, including the very 
elderly, the very young, the halt, lame and blind, are frequent. 
The mere presence of Travelers Aid desks in common carrier 
terminals, to lend assistance to those needing- it, is indicative 
that such stations are places where confusion and distractions 
abound. Often last minute connections must be attempted or 
undue delays endured. The common good demands that 
unnecessary interferences with the operation of such termi-
nals be eliminated. That is the proper public purpose sought 
to be served by the city ordinance in question. 
It is a matter of common knowledge, which police records 
confirm, that amid the confusion incident to arrivals and 
departures, luggage and purses are vulnerable to being 
snatched and pickpockets can and do operate profitably. 
Airports, bus depots, and railroad stations are places of 
escape, of rapid ingress and egress from metropolitan areas, 
and are often required to be placed ,under surveillance by 
federal, state and local police agencies. Other government 
agencies such as customs officers, agricultural inspectors, 
narcotic law enforcement officers, and health and quarantine 
officials are often on duty in such terminals. 
Furthermore, it is common knowledge that persons fre-
quenting stations, depots and airports are often under heavy 
emotional stress, being parted from, or united with loved 
ones; they are preoccupied with last minute personal com-
munications and deserve what little privacy may be left to 
them. In some terminals many would-be passengers are wait-
ing on a standby basis, particularly armed forces personnel, 
not knowing from one minute to the next whether they will be 
'I , 
:) 
. \ 
. , 
leaving or staying. In such situations emotions run high, 
nerves are taut and conditions are volatile. 
Terminals are normally surrounded by broad public side-
walk areas readily available for the exercise of First Amend-
ment rights, the distribution of handbills and like activities. 
Travelers gain access to the premises or leave by such side-
walks. It does not appear to constitute an unreasonable inter-
ference with First Amendment rights to require that persons 
desiring to exercise such rights withdraw to the public side-
walk areas to contact travelers for their purposes. 
The municipal regulation here involved should be upheld as 
a valid and reasonable approach to the maintenance of law 
and order and the protection of the traveling public, and not 
to constitute an undue interference with the exercise of First 
Amendment rights. 
I would deny the writ . 
McComb, J., concurred . 
